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overview paper
A survey on smart grid communication system
miles h.f. wen1, ka-cheong leung1, victor o.k. li1, xingze he2 and c.-c. jay kuo2
Concerns with global warming prompted many governments to mandate increased proportion of electricity generation from
renewable sources. This, together with the desire to have more efficient and secure power generation and distribution, has driven
research in the next-generation power grid, namely, the smart grid. Through integrating advanced information and commu-
nication technologies with power electronic and electric power technologies, smart grid will be highly reliable, efficient, and
environmental-friendly. A key component of smart grid is the communication system. This paper explores the design goals and
functions of the smart grid communication system, followed by an in-depth investigation on the communication requirements.
Discussions on some of the recent developments related to smart grid communication systems are also introduced.
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I . I NTRODUCT ION
The growing concerns about the emission of greenhouse
gases such as carbon dioxide and the desire for more reli-
able and efficient electricity transmission and distribution
are driving the development of a highly secure, reliable,
and environmental-friendly power grid system, namely, the
smart grid [1].
The Energy Information Administration projected a
total increase of about 1.8 in energy-related carbondioxide
emissions, from5498millionmetric tons in 2011 to 5599mil-
lion metric tons in 2040 [2]. Concerns with global warming
prompt the adoption of renewable energy sources in the
grid. A report by the Renewable Energy Policy Network for
the 21st Century (REN21) shows that there is a stable rapid
growth in utilizing renewable energy during the period
from 2007 to 2013. The wind power capacity has grown an
average of 25 annually, solar photovoltaics by 60, con-
centrated solar thermal power by 20, and biodiesel pro-
duction by 17.Moreover, the report also indicates that over
100 countries around the world have enacted some policies
relating to the adoption of renewable energy [3]. Unfortu-
nately, due to the intermittent nature of renewable sources,
many existing power grids will experience severe stabil-
ity problems when a large fraction of the energy generated
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comes from renewables. This further stimulates the needs
in developing smart grid.
In addition to the environmental concerns, security,
especially cyber security, has receivedmuch attention lately.
In 2009, a report showed that some cyber-spies had pene-
trated the U.S. electricity grid control system and laid some
spyware in the system. These malwares could be extremely
dangerous because, once activated by the attackers, the
electricity service could be disrupted or even totally par-
alyzed [4]. Since 2010, the US Department of Energy has
investedmore than $100million in numerous R&Dprojects
in industry, universities, and national laboratories to protect
the nation’s power grid from potential cyber attacks [5, 6].
Besides the environmental and security factors men-
tioned above, there is the traditional reliability issue. People
have been discussing the reliability issue of an electricity
network ever since its birth.However, the big blackout in the
USA in 2003 has demonstrated that reliability is lacking in
the traditional electricity grid. Another report has indicated
that the US electrical grid is getting less reliable over the
recent years [7, 8]. With smart grid, reliability is expected
to be greatly enhanced.
In designing smart grid, we have identified the ultimate
goals as follows:
(i) Adopt orderly renewable energy penetrations to protect
the environment;
(ii) Make the grid highly resilient against disturbances
caused by operation errors, malicious attacks, and nat-
ural disasters;
(iii) Provide reliable, secure, and high-quality electricity
services to consumers; and
(iv) Get consumers to actively participate in the energy
market and smooth the electricity demand or
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consumption curve for effective power generation-
consumption balancing.
The communication infrastructure is key to achieving the
aforementioned goals. For instance, one of the biggest chal-
lenges in increasing renewable energy sources in the grid is
due to their stochastic nature, rendering stable grid oper-
ation very difficult. However, if a robust communication
network is available, enabling better renewable predictions
and real-time automated regulations, we may be able to
overcome this challenge.
The objective of this paper is to survey the communi-
cation system of smart grid, identifying the key issues and
directions for future research. Unlike other related work
such as [9–13], our work intends to give readers an overview
of the entire smart grid communication system, together
with details on its requirements. To be specific [9], dis-
cusses the background and recent development on using
the electric power line as a medium to support last mile
communications in smart grid. Gharavi and Hu propose
a backpressure-based packet scheduling algorithm for load
balancing on communication traffic in a mesh network for
last mile communication in smart grid in [10]. Fan et al.
focus on communication challenges to achieve interoper-
ability and future smart metering networks in [11], Fang
et al. explore smart infrastructure system, smart manage-
ment system, and smart protection system in [12], and Lo
and Ansari summarized the progressive integration of dif-
ferent communication technologies into the old power sys-
tem in [13]. Our work concentrates on and gives an in-depth
survey on the communication systems for smart grid by dis-
cussing the communication requirements. We will facilitate
the design and development of the proper communication
systems for smart grid.
The paper is organized as follows. After a brief intro-
duction, we will introduce the general concepts of smart
grid, including its design goals, architecture, and functions,
in Section II. This will familiarize readers with the gen-
eral ideas about smart grid. Then, we will investigate in
details the communication requirements imposed on smart
grid in Section III. Some recent developments in smart grid
communication systemswill be discussed in Section IV, fol-
lowed by an introduction to some open research issues in
Section V and the conclusion in Section VI.
I I . OVERV IEW OF SMART GR ID
In this section, we will explore how smart grid differs
from the traditional one through studying its design goals.
Afterwards, we shall introduce its architecture and major
functions.
A) Design goals
According to [14–23], the design goals of smart grid are
environmental friendliness, reliability, flexibility, security,
quality, and efficiency, as shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Design goals of smart grid.
(i) Sustainability: In order to reduce the emissions of
green house gases as well as other wastes during
traditional power generation, high penetration of
renewable energy resources, such as wind and solar, is
expected in smart grid. Due to the stochastic nature
of renewables, maintaining the grid’s operational sta-
bility becomes one of the key challenges in smart grid
development.
(ii) Reliability: As with the traditional grid, smart grid
needs to provide reliable services, despite the intermit-
tent nature of renewable sources. The reliability of the
grid system primarily refers to the probability of the
grid to function properly without any failures [24, 25].
This further involves a feature of smart grid, named as
self-healing. Self-healing refers to smart grid’s capabil-
ity to anticipate disturbances and carry self-restoration
rapidly. Reliability has always been the focal area of
study when designing the electricity grid. It affects the
quality of power delivered to consumers [26].
(iii) Stability: According to [25, 27], the stability of an elec-
tric grid indicates its capability to continue intact oper-
ation following disturbances. This is a classic topic that
many people have been working on. However, as more
renewable energy penetration and less kinetic energy
reserve are present in smart grid, the stability issues are
yet to be properly addressed.
(iv) Flexibility: According to [28], smart grid needs to be
evolvable and adaptable so as to accommodate the vari-
ous challenges imposed on it due to the rapid changes of
technologies, policies, and consumer demands on the
electricity system. To achieve this, smart grid must be:
• able to accommodate a large number of communica-
tion technologies so as to allow the grid to integrate
easily with different platforms as well as interoperate
among different software and hardware; and
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• flexible to accommodate both regional and orga-
nizational differences across its service areas, espe-
cially those relating to the energy consumption habits
and availability of primary energy resources, such as
wind, solar, and so on.
(v) Security: Unlike legacy power system, smart grid has
placed much emphasis on security issues. The rea-
son is straightforward. First, it is well known that the
more complex a system is, the more vulnerable it is.
Envisioned as an integration of power system, infor-
mation system, and communication system, smart grid
is an extraordinarily complex system with potentially
numerous security vulnerabilities and threats. Due to
the unique features of power grid, these vulnerabilities
and threats are fairly easy to monetize. For example,
manipulation of energy costs is quite common in legacy
power systems, with an estimated loss of $6 billion in
USA [29]. Moreover, a recent report has shown that the
electric grid has been the target of many daily cyber-
attacks andmany utilities have not spent enough efforts
in protecting their system [30]. Undoubtedly, this sit-
uation will get worse in smart grid, since people do
not only save money but can also earn money easily
by trading stolen electricity. More seriously, malicious
adversaries or terrorists may be interested in launch-
ing large-scale attacks to smart grid with potentially
unpredictable consequences. In view of these concerns,
security has been regarded as one of the most impor-
tant issues in the current development and the future
deployment of smart grid. Simply put, the goal of
security in smart grid is to maintain confidentiality,
integrity, and availability as well as to protect user pri-
vacy. More specifically, envisioned smart grid system
must be capable of preventing sensitive data from being
exposed to unauthorized parties, or from being tam-
pered with by others. Timely access to and use of data
by authorized parties must be guaranteed as well. For
privacy, future smart grid system must ensure that the
use of data will not compromise individual’s privacy.
To achieve this goal, the unified efforts from differ-
ent stakeholders, including government, consumers,
industry, and academia are required.
(vi) Quality: The quality requirements of smart grid are
twofold, namely, the power quality in a power system
and quality of service (QoS) in a communication sys-
tem. Power quality refers to the deviations of voltage
or frequency from the expected values, which deter-
mine the capability of a power system to operate its
loads properly [31, 32]. On the other hand, QoS refers
to the capability of a communication system to pro-
vide different service levels, say, priorities, to different
applications according to their requirements, including
transmission latency, jitter, bandwidth, and so on [33].
(vii) Efficiency: Optimization is a key operation procedure
for smart grid. By allowing active customer participa-
tion, the market becomes more efficient in resource
allocation. By optimizing the electricity assets through
an advanced distributed storage (DS) and a better
control andmonitoring system, energy utilities operate
more efficiently.
B) The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) architecture
In 2007, the NIST was assigned the task to design a smart
grid architecture that “includes protocols and model stan-
dards for information management to achieve interoper-
ability of smart grid devices and systems” [34]. The Smart
Grid Interoperability Standards Project of NIST was com-
pleted in 2012, aiming to bring in a very robust, flexible,
uniform, and technology-neutral interoperable framework
for smart grid [21]. The framework consists of seven enti-
ties, namely, Markets, Operations, Service Providers, Bulk
Generation, Transmission, Distribution, and Customers, as
shown in Fig. 2. Each of the entities, known as “domains”,
further encompasses its own actors, applications, and set of
networks. These interconnected entities cooperate to sup-
port the smart grid functions. The role of each domain is
summarized as follows:
(i) Markets: The market domain consists of electricity
market participants and operators. This domain con-
tributes to efficiently matching the energy production
with consumption, through issuing real-time electricity
Fig. 2. NIST smart grid framework.
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pricing signals. Markets support energy bidding, dis-
tributed energy resources (DER) aggregation, energy
retailing, and so on. In addition, ancillary operations,
such as frequency regulation and voltage support, are
carried out based on information received from this
domain.
(ii) Operations: Electricity service operators are in this
domain. This domain aims to provide reliable and
smooth operations in a power system. It is either
physically connected or can communicate with all
other domains. Various control and monitoring appli-
cations, such as supervisory control and data acquisi-
tion (SCADA) and energy management system (EMS),
have their control centers in this domain. Moreover,
many operational management applications, including
fault management, asset maintenance, and operation
planning, can also be found here.
(iii) Service Providers: A service provider is an organiza-
tion that offers various electrical services to customers
and utilities. This domain acts as a business interme-
diary among Operations, Markets, and Customers. It
shares some communication interfaces and provides
services to these three domains, and plays a critical role
in the functionalities of these domains. Here, service
support includes customer management, billing, and
other emerging services.
(iv) Bulk Generation: Electricity generation plants are the
primary actors in this domain. Bulk generation initi-
ates the process of electricity provision and is typically
directly connected to transmission. Such direct con-
nection represents the most critical communications
in smart grid. It interfaces with Operations, Markets,
and Transmission to support generation control, power
flow measurement, plant protection, and other appli-
cations. Most importantly, this domain aims to con-
trol greenhouse gas emission, and increase renewable
energy penetrations with advanced storage devices for
smoothing out the variability in energy generation.
(v) Transmission: Transmission facilities, such as long-
distance overhead lines and transformers, reside in
this domain. This domain works as the intermedi-
ary between Bulk Generation and Distribution. In this
domain, efforts are spent primarily on two aspects,
namely, transmission stability maintenance and energy
loss reduction. It interfaces with Markets and Opera-
tions. Ancillary services are procured from the former,
and then scheduled and operated by the latter, and
finally delivered to Transmission. Most of the func-
tions supported by this domain, such as line voltage
monitoring and control, are carried out at transmission
substations.
(vi) Distribution: Distribution facilities, including distribu-
tion transformers and underground cables, are the key
entities in this domain. Distribution interconnects with
Transmission, Customers, Markets, and Operations. It
works closely with Operations to provide real-time
management of power flows. It also works with Mar-
kets to provide real-time generation and consumption
data. In addition to asset and line monitoring and con-
trol, this domain supports bi-directional power flows
and distributed energy generation management, say,
for photovoltaic cells placed at customer premises.
(vii) Customers: A customer generally refers to an elec-
tricity end user. Distributed electricity generation and
storage facilities are also found in this domain. This
domain can be further divided into three sub-domains,
namely, household, commercial, and industrial. This
domain is electrically connected to Distribution. It is
activated mostly with the help of advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI), which enables the communica-
tions with Distribution, Operations, Markets, and Ser-
vice Providers. In this domain, applications, such as
building/industrial automation and micro-generation,
are supported.
C) Functions
Four general functions are provided in smart grid, namely,
advanced monitoring and control (AMC), demand-side
management (DSM), generation and storage management
(GSM), and system protection (SP). These four functions
play the most important role in smart grid operation and
support various applications in smart grid.
(i) AMC refers to the function that continuously moni-
tors and efficiently controls the entire electricity sys-
tem. It is the most critical function in smart grid
since its failure contributes to a very high propor-
tion of the occurrences of disturbances in the past
decades [35]. The traditional system serving this func-
tion is the several-decade-old SCADA system, which
adopts a hierarchical architecture with remote termi-
nal units (RTUs) collecting system data and master
terminal units (MTUs) processing them and issuing
control commands. Recently, two types of new systems,
namely, wide-area measurement system (WAMS) and
wide-area stability and voltage control system (WACS),
have been developed to serve the AMC function for
smart grid. These two systems aim to provide fast and
reliable operations for smart grid, which in return con-
tribute to the self-healing feature of smart grid. In the
NIST smart grid architecture, this function primarily
works in the Operations, Bulk Generation, Transmis-
sion, and Distribution domains.
(ii) DSM refers to the load management function that
decides when to switch on or switch off loads to
reduce the grid operation costs as well as the elec-
tricity charges of the consumers. The general idea of
DSM is still very similar to the traditional paradigm,
which involves either directly controlling the “inter-
ruptible loads”, or stimulating consumers to shift their
electricity usage via changing the electricity rates [36].
However, this function in smart grid involves the par-
ticipation ofmore advanced technologies. For instance,
the real-time control of the charging and discharging
processes of electric vehicles (EVs), which is one of
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the major interruptible loads in smart grid, will play
a very important role in direct load control (DLC) in
smart grid. Besides, with the help of advanced meter-
ing infrastructure, consumers will be stimulated to
adjust their consumption behaviors by the adoption
of dynamic pricing. This function works primarily in
the Customers domain, being regulated according to
information from the Service Providers, Markets, and
Operations domains.
(iii) GSM is the function to manage various generation and
storage devices, either distributed or centralized. It is an
extension to the traditional generation dispatch func-
tion. That is, in addition to deciding which generators
in a centralized power plant to switch in or off at any
time in order to minimize the generation costs or pro-
tect particular generation plants, GSM extends to a
highly distributed system and decides where and how
much the excess energy generated should be stored.
Moreover, environmental effects will also be the major
factors that affect how GSM makes its decision. This
function primarily works in the Operations and Bulk
Generation domains, and may involve contributions
from the Markets, Service Providers, and Customers
domains, too.
(iv) SP refers to the function that carries out both preventive
and corrective actions so as to make the entire system
highly resilient against faults and disturbances, ulti-
mately enabling the self-healing feature of smart grid. It
is sometimes embedded in the system that provides the
AMC function. In the existing power grid, the scheme
that serves SP is known as special protection scheme
(SPS) or remedial action scheme (RAS). The function-
ality of SP needs contributions from all seven domains
of smart grid.
I I I . COMMUN ICAT ION
REQU IREMENTS
To develop the communication system for smart grid, the
key is to understand its requirements. In this section, we
investigate the requirements for the smart grid communi-
cation system to function properly. We carry out the inves-
tigation by classifying all requirements into four categories,
namely, data transmission, cyber security, data privacy, and
interoperability.
A) Data transmission
The data transmission requirements of the smart grid
communication system primarily include transmission rate,
latency, and reliability. Transmission rate determines the
volume of data that can be sent to a destination through
the communication network within a certain time. Latency
refers to the time it takes a piece of data to reach a desti-
nation correctly. Reliability measures how likely a certain
piece of data is received correctly. Since different func-
tions of smart grid have very distinct requirements on data
transmission, we are going to discuss the requirements for
each of the four smart grid functions as follows.
For AMC, SCADA is the most widely used automa-
tion system in the traditional electricity grid. It consists
of RTUs that collect system status data and actuate con-
trol commands and MTUs that process data received from
RTUs and issue commands to them. These RTUs andMTUs
communicate with each other via various communication
technologies [37, 38]. However, SCADA was found lack-
ing in fulfilling those specified transmission requirements
and it provides inadequate situational awareness to opera-
tors, making them unaware of disturbances in neighboring
control areas and eventually unable to limit the spread of
disturbances [28, 39–41]. In order to alleviate the problem,
a new systemor an upgraded SCADA system forAMCmust
be developed, which must provide:
• High data acquisition rate so that a relatively large amount
of data could be gathered for the system to make a bet-
ter decision. For instance, when more advanced mea-
surements, such as transmission line vibration [42] and
substation transformer temperature [43], are needed for
advanced control, considerable amount of data will be
generated and transmitted through the network within a
certain time limit.
• Low latency (<1 s) so that by the time the monitoring
data reach the control center, they could give operators
a better estimation of the current situation. It is worth
noting that this low-latency requirement is just a general
function-level specification. In March 2005, a standard
specifying the detailed transmission time requirements
for the automation system was released by IEEE, which
brings the latency requirements to application levels [44].
However, this standard was published almost a decade
ago, when the concept of smart grid had not been devel-
oped. Therefore, there is an urgent need to develop a new
specification for smart grid latency requirements.
• High data reliability so that data gathered for real-time
decision making can be correctly received by control cen-
ters (Fig. 3).
Working tightly with AMC, SP has very similar require-
ments, except that it will require extremely low transmission
latency (usually not exceeding a few milliseconds [37]) and
higher reliability, due to the fact that SP usually handles
very severe emergencies that, if not solved within a short
period, could cause disastrous or cascading failures of the
entire system. In the traditional grid, SPS/RAS has been
working with SCADA to serve SP for decades. SPS/RAS
consists of a set of programs and devices that will protect
against blackouts or brownouts when there are no faulty
equipment in the power system [45, 46]. The architecture
of SPS/RAS is almost identical to that of SCADA, except
for some special devices (mostly protection relays) installed
at necessary positions. However, it has been found that the
traditional SPS/RAS works only for pre-defined emergency
disturbances but responds extremely slowly to arbitrary
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Fig. 3. An illustration of a simplified, hierarchical SCADA system.
contingencies. Hence, some changes must be made to alle-
viate the problem [47, 48].
Hence, due to the inadequacy of SCADA to support
AMCand SPS/RAS for SP, twonew systems, namely,WAMS
[49] and WACS [47], have been developed in recent years.
Both systems are designed to satisfy the requirements stated
above.
• WAMS provides power operators with advanced moni-
toring capabilities. It utilizes phasor measurement units
(PMUs) to collect GPS-synchronized dynamic power sys-
tem data (with synchronization error <1ms) at a very high
sampling rate (up to 60 samples/s) and phasor data con-
centrators (PDCs) to concentrate PMU data and deliver
them to control centers. This can thus help improve the
security, stability, and reliability of the power system.
Interested readers can refer to [49–55] for details. A sim-
ple illustration of the WAMS architecture is exhibited in
Fig. 4.
• WACS is the modern grid wide-area control system. It
primarily utilizes data gathered by WAMS and carries
out real-time stability and voltage control (e.g. boosting
the exciter on a synchronous generator) on the power
grid. WACS is also sometimes called wide-area protec-
tion system (WAPS) since it also serves the SP function
by responding to arbitrary emergency disturbances in the
system. Hence, it is considered as a supplement and a
partial substitution of SPS/RAS [47, 56–58].
Although WAMS and WACS are newly developed systems
for supporting AMC in smart grid, it is desirable for them
to be compatible with SCADA since electricity compa-
nies have made huge investments on SCADA during the
past decades [57]. Efforts have been made by employing
some alternative techniques to utilize phasormeasurements
obtained by WAMS as additional data to carry out state
estimation in the modern EMS [59, 60].
In December 2011, PMU data format has been standard-
ized in IEEE STD. C37.118.1 and IEEE STD. C37.118.2 [61, 62].
IEEE STD. C37.118.1 introduces the fundamentals of
PMU data, including synchrophasor representations and
synchrophasor measurement requirements. IEEE STD.
C37.118.2 focuses on the PMU data transmissions by intro-
ducing the WAMS network and defining the transmis-
sion protocol and data format. Moreover, an experimental
scheme for PMU data communications over IP network is
also introduced in this document. A more recent standard
published by IEEE in 2013, IEEE STD. C.37.242-2013, has
provided a guideline for calibration, testing, and installa-
tion of PMUs [63]. However, the functionality of PDC is not
Fig. 4. An illustration of a WAMS system.
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standardized yet, though two PDC designs have been pro-
posed in [64, 65]. A recent study by Wen et al. investigated
the possibility of installing extra PDC in a WAMS network
to reduce the total traffic [55].
Since the functionality of GSM partly relies on AMC,
the data transmission requirements for GSM are similar
to those for AMC. However, GSM will have to handle
numerous distributed generation (DG) and storage units,
some of which are intermittent renewable generation units.
It will require considerable amount of data to be gener-
ated and transmitted through the network for real-time
management.
As discussed in Section II-C, the functionalities of GSM
are twofold, namely, more advanced generation dispatch
function on the centralized generation plants, and efficient
management of DERs. Recent developments of the former
include new generation dispatch schemes, such as risk-
limiting dispatch [66–69], while those for the latter include
the introduction of a new concept, calledmicrogrid.
Microgrid, as illustrated in Fig. 5, is a subsystem of a
power grid consisting of DG and DS units that can dis-
connect themselves from the grid in order to isolate the
microgrid’s loads from disturbances automatically. In other
words, microgrid is a subsystem of the power grid that can
operate when it is: (1) connected to the grid, (2) islanded
from the grid, or (3) transitioning between these twomodes.
Besides, microgrid has a nice plug-and-play functionality
that allows DG units and loads to come and go smoothly
and rapidly in real time, thus accommodating the stochas-
tic nature of renewables [70–76]. Promising as microgrids
are, they requires carefully designed distributed monitor-
ing and control mechanisms to operate optimally. This will
put additional loads to the smart grid communication sys-
tem and, therefore, additional communication bandwidth
should be reserved when one designs communication sys-
tems for a microgrid-enabled smart grid [77].
DSM generally refers to two different techniques. The
first technique is demand response (DR) that requires
Fig. 5. A typical microgrid.
customer participation by responding to changes in elec-
tricity prices [78]. The other function is DLC that directly
manages some of the interruptible loads, such as air condi-
tioners and heaters, to minimize both the system operation
costs and consumer consumption costs [36, 79, 80].
As compared to the other three functions, DSM has rela-
tively looser requirements on data transmission. Except for
the requirement of a highly reliable communication link, it
has the following requirements:
• Lower average but bursty transmission rate compared to
that of AMC. Although DSM involves the participation of
a large number of nodes, the transmission load for mes-
sages at each node is moderate. Take AMI as an example.
Typically, price update signals are transmitted to smart
meters at the consumer end once per hour or per half an
hour.
• Relatively higher transmission latency (although still
within a few seconds) could be tolerated by DSM.
DR in smart grid is primarily achieved with the help of
AMI. A network of smart meters that allows consumers to
respond actively to grid operation status signals by means
of real-time pricing [81–83]. In order to allow consumers to
respond in an optimalmanner, some automatedDR systems
are to be developed [84–86].
Besides DR, plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) can play an
important role in DLC for smart grid. As exhibited in Fig. 6,
PEVs can play three different roles, namely, storage, source,
and load, interchangeably. Properlymanaged, they will have
a great potential for improving the performances of smart
grid operations. For instance, the aggregated PEVs could
help regulate the voltage profile, reduce costs and emissions,
improve frequency regulations, and so on [87–91].
Combining the results from [92, 93], the data trans-
mission requirements of each of the four functions are
summarized in Table 1.
B) Cyber security
In Fig. 2, each domain is composed of a certain number of
actors which may be sub-systems, applications, devices, or
Fig. 6. The role of a PEV in smart grid.
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Table 1. Data transmission requirements for the four smart grid
functions.
Rate (kbps) Latency Reliability ()
AMC 56–128 15–200ms 99.0–99.99
DSM 9.6–56 500ms–5min 99.0–99.99
GSM 56–256 200ms–1 s 99.0–99.99
SP 56–128 10–200ms 99.9–99.999
other participants in smart grid. Each actor may exchange
data with other actors within the same domain or in other
domains. In such a large and highly interconnected complex
system, cyber security is a critical issue for the reliability
of the whole system as mentioned in Section I, especially
when the public communication network (e.g. Internet) is
introduced and adopted.
Comparedwith physical attacks, cyber attacks, which are
not constrained by distance, are generally less risky, cheaper,
and much easier to coordinate and replicate. With a lit-
tle basic knowledge about the structure and operation of
the network, adversaries are able to launch various attacks
wherever they are through a set of interconnected comput-
ers or even just smart phones. Many incidents indicate the
seriousness of cyber security. In March 2007, researchers
at the Department of Energy’s Idaho lab launched an
experimental cyber attack causing a generator to self-
destruct [94]. In 2008, evidence showed that hackers had
penetrated power systems and caused a power outage affect-
ing multiple cities [95]. Besides, virus, worms, and other
malwares raise other cyber security issues in smart grid. In
2009, for example, a security consulting firm showed a sim-
ulation in which more than 15 000 out of 22 000 homes had
their smart meters hijacked by a worm within 24 h [96].
More recently, researchers have already created a worm that
spread among smart meters [29].
In order to mitigate these concerns, cyber security in
smart grid aims at maintaining availability, integrity, and
confidentiality of the entire system. It is worth noting that,
different from an information and communication system,
a power system is concerned more about availability than
integrity and confidentiality. However, with the increasingly
complex interactions among different components in smart
grid, massive sensitive data are produced and propagated.
Confidentiality is becoming an increasingly important issue
in the development of smart grid.
(i) Availability: Simply put, availability requires a system
to provide the right information to the right people
within the right time period. Take the well-known
blackout in 2003 as an example. Although the inci-
dent was initially caused by an equipment problem, the
ongoing and cascading failures were primarily due to
the unavailability of information at the control center
about what had happened in the system. In smart grid,
many events may cause traffic congestion and hence
increased message delay, thereby causing the availabil-
ity problem. Typical examples include denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks, malwares, and equipment malfunction.
(ii) Integrity: Message integrity is another critical factor for
the reliable operation of smart grid. Without effective
protection, it is not difficult for a user tomodify his/her
power consumption data recorded by a smart meter so
as to reduce his/her electricity charge. If somemalicious
hackers take advantage of this by modifying a power
demand message, the utility may generate and deliver
more than enough electricity to the system. This may
either cause the wastage of electricity, or compromise
many digital sensitive devices. More seriously, a large
scale attackmight bemounted through fabricating con-
trol data and controlling smart meters. All controlled
smart meters would be switched off simultaneously.
(iii) Confidentiality: Confidentiality in smart grid prevents
the transmitted data from being exposed to unautho-
rized parties and has the following two major benefits.
First, it is difficult for adversaries to intercept and ana-
lyze the network data. For example, with an effective
encryption scheme, an adversary who does not have
access to the secret key is unable to decrypt any inter-
cepted ciphertext for the corresponding plaintext. Sec-
ond, it is critical to protect user privacy, which is to be
discussed.
For the availability issues, a variety of monitoring tools and
techniques can be adopted in smart grid system to detect
attacks and abnormal activities or conditions, such as intru-
sion detection system, intrusion prevention system, mali-
cious code protection system, and network monitoring sys-
tem. Compared to enterprise systems, a control system has
a relatively stable number of users, a limited number of pro-
tocols as well as a regular set of communication patterns. All
these features may simplify the design and implementation
of the above monitoring tools and techniques.
Cryptography-based schemes are usually used to cope
with the integrity and confidentiality issues. Due to the
scale and limited resources (e.g. central processing units,
memory, and communication bandwidth) of devices, the
conventional techniques in computer networks may not
performwell in smart grid.Many challenges and issues have
to be addressed. Specific adaptations or novel algorithms
have to be designed for smart grid. In [97], several smart
grid security issues were discussed, including the manage-
ment problems of a large-scale public key infrastructure
(PKI) system and the updating problems of cryptographic
keys due to the limited capabilities of processors. The
PKI implementation issues in smart grid were investigated
in [98]. Besides, a series of trial standards and guidelines are
now available [21, 99–102], some of which will be discussed
in later sections.
C) Data privacy
To achieve high intelligence and automation in a smart
grid system, smart meters are required to provide some
fine-grained details in the power consumption data of a
user within a much shorter time interval (say, 15 min)
than before. This transformation from aggregate data to
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Fig. 7. Power usage to personal activity mapping [103].
granular data inevitably brings in the privacy issues. Using
some technologies like non-intrusive loadmonitoring, daily
activities of individuals are recorded as shown in Fig. 7. Due
to the interoperability requirement of smart grid, many par-
ties besides the utilities have access to such records. More
seriously, it is not difficult for data analysts to derive further
information that may invade user privacy. For example, the
number of daily heating cycles of a water heater may indi-
cate the number of people living in the house. The electricity
consumption of a home may show whether it is occupied
or not. The daily usage of electricity may reflect when the
home owner wakes up, leaves for work, and so on. Besides,
the charging data of a PEV may be used to track the trav-
eling schedule of an individual and his/her location. Many
third-party companies may be interested in these sensi-
tive private data to exploit their commercial benefits. This
will undoubtedly give rise to the privacy concerns during
various data processing phases, like monitoring, collection,
aggregation, and analysis. [104] has proposed a privacy-
preserving scheme to allow communication between smart
meters and the utilities.
For data privacy, some relevant laws and regulations have
to be enacted first. They must be clear on who owns and
controls the data, who has the right to access the user data,
how do utilities or other parties share the user data with-
out compromising privacy, and how to manage the huge
amount of sensitive data. Secondly, information and com-
munication technologies are potential alternatives to cope
with the data privacy issues, such as homomorphic encryp-
tion [105, 106]. An ideal lattice-based fully homomorphic
encryption scheme proposed by Gentry in 2009 is well-
known as a great breakthrough in this field [107]. Although
the current fully homomorphic encryption schemes are still
too inefficient to be practical, it indeed brings hopes and
motivations for research in this area. For smart grid, privacy
and interoperability concerns would be largely mitigated
with efficient, fully homomorphic encryption schemes.
D) Interoperability
As a system of systems, smart grid has to ensure interop-
erability among the power systems, information systems,
and communication systems. A good design of one partic-
ular system without proper consideration of other systems
will not achieve the best result for the whole system. Infor-
mation, like the user data and control message, which is
produced and transmitted in one particular system, may
also be used in other systems. Importantly, data are gener-
ated in vast quantities in smart grid. How to manage, store,
and effectively use these data become a critical issue.
The interoperability of smart grid allows utilities, con-
sumers, and other stakeholders to communicate securely
and effectively, even though there are a variety of different
information systems over geographically dispersed regions.
In September 2011, IEEE published IEEE STD. 2030 as a
guideline of the interoperability issues in smart grid, and
this will be discussed in Section IV-E.
Last but not least, since building smart grids from the
existing power systems is an incremental process, the inter-
operability of new functionalities/systems with the exist-
ing ones must be properly addressed, too. For instance,
althoughWAMS andWACSwill eventually replace SCADA
in the future smart grid, the change will not happen unless
WAMS, WACS, and SCADA are interoperable with each
other during the upgrade process [108–110].
I V . THE SMART GR ID
COMMUN ICAT ION NETWORK
STRUCTURES AND TECHNOLOG IES
Since smart grid will have monitoring and controlling
capability throughout the system from generation to end
user sites, the communication network of smart grid is
proposed in a similar hierarchy of wide area network
(WAN), neighborhood area network (NAN), and home
area network (HAN), accordingly [111]. HAN connects to
smart grid via smart meters and provides communica-
tions and energy management among appliances at the
user premises. NAN connects multiple HANs to WAN.
Apart from being part of AMI, NAN may also sup-
port DG and the automation of the distribution network.
WAN connects NANs, distribution substations, automa-
tion, and monitoring devices/systems (such as SCADA,
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RTU, and PMU) to the transmission substations and util-
ity enterprise computer networks, and further to the public
Internet. Note that HAN, NAN, and WAN have different
maximum transmission distances in the order of 100m,
10 and 100 km, respectively. The required transmission
bandwidths of HAN, NAN, and WAN are in million, hun-
dred millions, and 10 gbps, respectively. Different commu-
nication media and transmission technologies are therefore
used in HAN, NAN, and WAN to ensure cost-effective
performance.
In HAN and NAN, communication cost is a major
factor for consideration because of the large number of
connecting devices [23]. Wireless and power line commu-
nications (PLCs) will be the appropriate communication
technologies. Wireless communications have the advan-
tages of no wiring cost, flexible deployment, and easily
connecting large number of devices. However, they also
have the shortcomings of lower communication band-
width, shorter transmission distance, and security con-
cerns. Hence, wireless communications are mainly used
in HAN, and sometimes in NAN if the required trans-
mission distance is short. Among the wireless commu-
nication schemes, Zipbee and WiFi are the two attrac-
tive wireless solutions. Zigbee is an IEEE 802.15.4-based,
low power, low-cost, and two-way wireless communica-
tion standard. It normally has transmission range up to
75 m, and supports up to 65 000 networked devices, and
transmission bandwidths of 20–250 kbps depending on the
applied industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) frequency
band, i.e. 864, 915 MHz, and 2.4GHz. On the other hand,
WiFi is an IEEE 802.11 wireless local area network (WLAN)
standard, also on the ISM frequency band (e.g., 2.4 GHz).
It provides coverage range from 30 to 100m, up to 255
connections to an access point (AP), and physical trans-
mission throughput from 11 to 600mbps depending on
the applied standard/technology. At the moment, the main
advantage of Zipbee over WiFi is the power consump-
tion. However, this advantage is diminishing as power con-
sumption of WiFi chipsets has been undergoing significant
improvements.
PLCs use power lines as media for data communica-
tions to eliminate the requirement of additional physical
infrastructure. Standards such as IEEE 1901 and ITU-T
G9960/61 have been developed recently to promote the
applications of PLCs. The deployment cost for PLCs is
therefore low similar to that of wireless communications.
However, the transmission distance and bandwidth of PLCs
are rather limited since power grids are designed for elec-
tricity transmission. Data transmissions are sent on carrier
frequencies (3–500KHz for narrowband PLCs (NB-PLCs)
and 1–30MHz for broadband PLCs (BB-PLCs)) far higher
than the utility frequency, i.e., 50 or 60Hz. The qual-
ity of PLC signals is often degraded by path attenuation,
electricity noise, and the interference from wireless com-
munication signals. Hence, PLCs may serve the applica-
tions in HAN and even NAN but it may not be suitable
for WAN. For example, NB-PLCs can have 100 km trans-
mission distance but only with hundred bits per second
transmission rate. BB-PLCs with millions bits per second
transmission rate can only have the transmission distance of
a 100m.
Owing to the distance and bandwidth requirements
of smart grid WAN communication network, optical
fiber communications is one of the appropriate media/
technologies. Note that single mode optical fibers can have
less than 0.2 dB attenuation per kilometer for optical sig-
nals. Thousand kilometers transmission distance can be
easily achieved with optical fibers using commercially avail-
able optical amplifiers, e.g., erbium-doped fiber amplifier
(EDFA). A single fiber can provide more than 80 wave-
length division multiplexing (WDM) channels, each with
100GHz bandwidth and immune to electrical noise. At the
moment, no other technologies can have similar advan-
tages of distance and bandwidth as that of optical fibers.
Surely, cost is the main concern with the deployment of
optical networks. Recently, passive optical networks (PONs)
technologies such as Ethernet PON (EPON) and Gigabit
PON (GPON) have become popular. This reduces the cost
slightly for optical network deployment. To have further
cost reduction, one may share the optical network band-
width with other applications and traffic.
A mechanism is needed to unify the mixed commu-
nications from different networking technologies in the
smart grid communication network. As suggested by NIST,
the Internet Protocol (IP) is the practical approach for
solving the problem. IP has the flexibility of exchang-
ing information between applications independent of the
underlying physical communications technologies. Using
IP for smart grid communication networks, however, brings
new challenges beyond those in traditional communica-
tion networks. We believe IPv6 (IP version 6) will be a
key enabler of smart grid communications. The commu-
nications of sensing/monitoring devices in smart grid will
need a huge number of network addresses that cannot be
provided by the current IPv4 since its 32-bit address space
has been almost exhausted. Smart grid applications such as
real timemonitoringwill need special QoS (e.g., guaranteed
latency and loss) and security that have not been well sup-
ported in IPv4. Moreover, the battery-powered smart sen-
sors/devices in smart grid for distributed monitoring and
control will only have low processing capability and trans-
mit packets over unreliable/noisy media such as wireless
and PLC links. Note that IPv6 has 128-bit address space and
better built-in QoS/security control. The new IPv6 associ-
ated standards such as Routing Protocol for Low-power and
lossy links (RPL) and IPv6 over Low powerWPAN (6LoW-
PAN) are going to solve the problems of low processing
capability, and packet routing over unreliable links. Though
the smart grid communication network is evolving, IPv6
has demonstrated the potential capability and flexibility to
solve the potential problems.
To learn more, readers are encouraged to attend IEEE
SmartGridComm [112], IEEE ICC [113], IEEE ISGT [114],
IEEE PES-GM [115], and other related conferences where
people discuss the most recent research development in
smart grid communications.
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V . RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
SMART GR ID COMMUN ICAT IONS
A) Communication framework
Due to the concern that the conceptual smart grid frame-
work proposed byNIST, as shown in Fig. 2, could be a bit too
complicated for researchers in data communication to deal
with, amuch simpler three-entity smart grid framework has
been proposed [116, 117]. As shown in Fig. 8, this simplified,
communication-oriented framework consists of Operation
Network, Business Network, and Consumer Network.
Operation Network contains all the communication sys-
tems needed by a power system that manages the power
flow from the generation side to the consumption side. In
other words, it contains Bulk Generation, Transmission,
Distribution, and Operations of the NIST framework.
Business Network refers to the communication system
that enables the advanced smart grid electricity market as
well as various new services provided by different smart grid
companies. In other words, it contains Service Providers
and Markets of the NIST framework.
Consumer Network covers all the communication tech-
nologies to be used at a consumer’s premise, primarily a
local area network (LAN) connecting various smart devices,
such as smart meters, smart controllers, and PEVs, alto-
gether. It is equivalent to the Customers domain in theNIST
framework.
In addition to this framework, the conceptual architec-
ture of the lower-level subnetwork for each of the three enti-
ties, and the communication requirements needed for inter-
connecting these three entities have also been presented.
This three-entity framework not only gives researchers a
much simpler option for a high-level view of the smart grid
communication system, but also encourages researchers
from different fields to collaborate with each other.
B) IEEE STD. 1815-2012
IEEE STD. 1815-2012, also known as Distributed Network
Protocol (DNP3), is a popular communication protocol for
SCADA since 1990s. The latest version of DNP3 [118] has
been standardized by IEEE in 2012, which aims to:
Fig. 8. Three-entity communication-oriented smart grid framework.
Fig. 9. DNP3 master-outstation model.
(i) Use the minimal bandwidth;
(ii) Make remote devices intelligent;
(iii) Share the best features of all other existing protocols;
(iv) Be compatible with other existing standards; and
(v) Be highly reliable.
As illustrated in Fig. 9, the general DNP3 protocol follows
a three-layer model, termed Enhanced Performance Archi-
tecture (EPA). The three layers include the application layer
(AL), the data link layer (DLL), and the physical layer (PL).
AL is the top layer in the model, interfacing with the user
software and the lower layers. It provides functions, data for-
mats, and procedures for efficient data transmission. DLL
provides error detection and station addressing for trans-
mitting the AL data across the communication channel. PL,
which goes beyond the DNP3 standard descriptions, pro-
vides bitwise data transmission through the physical com-
munication media. There is no dedicated transport layer
(TL) in the DNP3 protocol stack, unlike the one in a typical
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model. The
transport function (TF) is implemented within AL to divide
AL data into some smaller segments so that they could be
transmitted over noisy links more easily. The existence of
TF instead of TL is primarily because of the concerns of
compatibility, reliability, and execution speed.
Due to the increasing user demands for implementing
DNP3 over high-speed digital networks, IEEE STD. 1815-
2012 defines how to transport DNP3 data over the IP suite.
The solution provided is to implement a connection man-
agement layer (CML) below DNP3 DLL. CML is on top
of the transport layer, network layer, link layer, and phys-
ical layer of the IP network. CML thus interfaces between
DNP3 and IP.
Although SCADA is a legacy system and may not ade-
quately satisfy the requirements of AMC in smart grid, it is
not economical to merely abandon SCADA in smart grid.
Therefore, we believe that DNP3 may provide a reasonable
option for enhancing the performance of SCADA.
C) NISTIR 7628
NISTIR 7628, namely,Guidlines for SmartGridCyber Secu-
rity, is a three-volume report which presents a framework
to help organizations make effective cyber security strate-
gies [99–101]. The guideline was developed in 2010 by
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Fig. 10. DNP3 over the IP suite.
NIST Cyber SecurityWorking Group (CSWG) of the Smart
Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP), which consists of more
than 400 participants including federal agencies, regula-
tory organizations, standard organizations, vendors, service
providers, manufacturers, and academia.
The first volume of the guideline begins with a discus-
sion of the cyber security strategies used by SGIP–CSWG
for the development of this guideline. It examines both
domain-specific and common requirements of the cyber
security issues for a series of tasks in smart grid, such as risk
assessment, and requirement identification and modifica-
tion. The analytical approach described in this part could
serve as a guidance for organizations to identify high-level
cyber security requirements for their own systems. The first
volume then proposes a smart grid conceptual model fol-
lowed by a detailed logistic reference model. Each interface
in the logistic reference model is analyzed and assigned
an appropriate impact level (high, moderate, or low) with
regard to security. The high-level security requirements
are thoroughly analyzed and discussed. Cryptographic and
key management issues are carefully addressed along with
potential alternatives. The second volume, focusing on the
privacy issues, first discusses the privacy impact assessment
and mitigating factors in smart grid. Besides the potential
privacy issues, this volume also gives some high-level rec-
ommendations for privacy solutions. The third volume has
abundant supportive analysis and references and the poten-
tial vulnerabilities in smart grid are discussed in details.
Moreover, a number of security problems, but without spe-
cific solutions, are identified. Research and development
themes for cyber security of smart grid are carefully dis-
cussed as well.
For the information and communication system, some
high-level cyber security requirements are listed below:
(i) Separation of communication and control: This
requires the control of communication to be physically
or logically separated from the telemetry/data
acquisition service.
(ii) DoS protection: This requires smart grid to mitigate or
limit the impacts of all kinds of DoS attacks.
(iii) Communication integrity and confidentiality: This
requires organizations to employ some cryptographic
mechanisms to ensure data integrity and prevent
the unauthorized disclosure of information during
transmission.
(iv) Message authenticity: This provides authenticity of
message and devices in communication. It is used to
protect frommalformed traffic, misconfigured devices,
and malicious entities. It is suggested to be imple-
mented inside the protocol.
(v) Honeypot: It is designed to be a target of various
attacks, which are detected, tracked, and analyzed by
collecting the attack data.
D) IEEE STD. 1711-2010
IEEE STD. 1711, i.e. IEEE Trial Use Standard for a Cryp-
tographic Protocol for Cyber Security of Substation Serial
Links, has developed a trial standard for a cryptographic
protocol used for serial communication among SCADA
substations [119]. The standardized protocol, known as
the serial SCADA protection protocol (SSPP), provides
integrity and optional confidentiality for cyber security of
serial links connecting substations. With the minimal over-
heads, SSPP encapsulates each SCADA or application mes-
sages in a cryptographic envelope before sending it to the
underlying communication protocols (e.g. DNP3 andMod-
bus) for efficient authentication and encryption. SSPP is
not limited to serial SCADA communication, but is also
applicable to other types of serial communication (e.g. data
concentrator and load management links). However, appli-
cations or systems are required to tolerate message losses
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Table 2. Cipher suites in SSPP.
Cipher suite
number Cipher suite Comments
0x0004 AES+ CTR mode+
HMAC-SHA256
Used for dynamic sessions
0x0005 AES+ PE mode+
HMAC-SHA256
Used for dynamic sessions
with a session clock
0x0006 Plaintext+ SHA256 No security provided
0x0008 Plaintext+HMAC-SHA256 Used for dynamic sessions
0x000A AES+ CBC mode+
HMAC-SHA256
Used for dynamic sessions
since SSPP is designed to discard susceptible messages. The
cipher suites adopted in SSPP are shown in Table 2.
SSPP is designed to support three kinds of communica-
tion links, namely, point-to-point, multi-drop, and broad-
cast. In addition, the mixed mode operation, in which
some of the substations use SSPP to protect communication
among each other, whereas others communicate in plain-
text, is introduced to support both multi-drop and broad-
cast links. This is motivated by considering the flexibility
of the SSPP deployment in the future smart grid system.
By using the mixed mode, SSPP can be implemented in an
incremental fashion so that there is no need for all substa-
tions to implement SSPP at the same time. Besides, SSPP can
be implemented as standalone security devices, integrated
in communicationmodems, or embedded in applications or
systems. The standalone bump-in-the-wire security device
approach, as shown in Fig. 11, needs little or nomodification
of the existing systems and equipment for legal serial system
updates.
However, it is worth noting that the standard does not
address the key management issue for SSPP.
E) IEEE STD. 2010-2011
Sponsored by the IEEE Standards Coordinating Commit-
tee 21 on Fuel Cells, Photovoltaics, Dispersed Generation,
and Energy Storage, IEEE STD. 2030, i.e. IEEE Guide
for Smart Grid Interoperability of Energy Technology
and Information Technology Operation with the Electric
Power System (EPS), End-Use Applications, and Loads,
has recently been developed as a guideline for supporting
interoperability in smart grid [120]. The guideline intro-
duces smart grid as “a complex system of systems” and
lists the 12 architectural principles for smart grid, including
openness, extensibility, scalability, interoperability, security,
and privacy. Particularly, it discusses in details interop-
erability and interoperability-related security, privacy, and
reliability requirements in smart grid. For extensibility,
scalability, and upgradability, the smart grid interoperabil-
ity reference model (SGIRM) is proposed through three
different perspectives, namely, power system, communi-
cation system, and information system. Specifically, the
power system interoperability (PS-IAP) puts an emphasis
on power generation, transmission, distribution, and con-
sumption. The communication technology interoperability
(IT-IAP) represents a view of the control of processes and
data management flow. The communication technology
interoperability (CT-IAP) emphasizes the interconnectiv-
ity and communication among systems, applications, and
devices. Each of the above reference models divides the
whole system into domains with respect to different per-
spectives. Constraints, issues, and impacts on interoper-
ability are considered for each domain. The relationship
on the characteristics of data exchanged among domains
is carefully examined. This detailed reference model pro-
vides stakeholders basic understanding of the interoperabil-
ity criteria and help them identify and define the optimal
design criteria for the interoperability of future smart grid
implementations.
F) Smart grid demonstration projects
Over the past few years, there have been numerous smart
grid demonstration projects that provide invaluable insights
into the development of smart grid. In this subsection, we
will briefly introduce three of the most prominent demon-
stration projects and their significance in building smart
grids.
Fig. 11. Retrofit bump-in-the-wire SSPP deployment [119].
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In late 2010, National Rural Electric Cooperative Asso-
ciation (NRECA) has initiated a $68 million Smart Grid
Demonstration Project (SGDP) to “examine various smart
grid technologies for their technical effectiveness, suitability
to the cooperative business model, and return on invest-
ment (ROI)” [121]. Co-funded by the U.S Department of
Energy (DOE) under the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), SGDP involves 23 electric
cooperative that serve over 750 000 consumers across 12
states in the U.S. In particular, SGDP investigated AMI
technologies, communication systems, conservation volt-
age reduction, consumer acceptance of smart grid tech-
nologies, DR, energy storage, and meter data management
technologies [122].
The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Smart Grid
Demonstration Initiative (SGDI) is a seven-year collabora-
tive research that investigates the integration of DER into
the grid and the electricity market. This multi-million dol-
lar project involves 24 contributing utilities from Australia,
Canada, France, Ireland, Japan, and the USA. By the year
2015, EPRI SGDI has tested various technologies includ-
ing remote dispatch of customer-owned resources, reliabil-
ity enhancement with DER, self-healing technologies for
smart grid, use of storage for voltage smoothing and peak
shifting [123].
Costing a a total of €53 million, GRID4EU is the biggest
smart grid project funded by the European Union [124].
By 2015, GRID4EU has initiated six demonstration projects
in Germany, Sweden, Spain, Italy, Czech Republic, and
France, respectively, mostly focusing on grid automations
and renewable energy integration. This 51-month project is
expected to be completed by Jan. 2016.
V I . OPEN RESEARCH ISSUES
Since smart grid is relatively new, numerous problems
remain to be solved. In this section, we will give a brief
discussion on some of these problems.
A) Communication support for
vehicle-to-grid (V2G) system
It is well-known that PEVs, with the ability to play roles
including loads, sources, and storages, have a significant
potential to improve the effectiveness of smart grid oper-
ations. However, since the capacity of a battery inside a
PEV is too small to have a significant impact on the entire
grid while unregulated charging of too many PEVs may
lead to electricity shortage in the grid, researchers need to
study how to effectively and efficiently manage and reg-
ulate the charging and discharging processes of PEVs in
smart grid. This is called the V2G problem. Researchers are
now developing an optimal charging strategy that can meet
numerous objectives in smart grid. Although how commu-
nication systems affect the performances of V2G systems
has been discussed in the literature [103, 125–130], how to
build an optimal communication system to support V2G is
yet to be addressed. Moreover, user privacy issues have not
been fully investigated in the literature.
B) WAMS communication network
Despite the numerous advantages that WAMS could bring
to smart grid operation, as discussed in Section III-A, its
high transmission rate, low latency, and high reliability
requirements make it very challenging to design an appro-
priate communication network for WAMS. In this design
process, one of the most critical issues is to decide the
protocol(s) to be used. The TCP/IP suite would not be a
likely solution to WAMS due to its best-effort design and
high unpredictability. Traditional industry protocols used
in SCADA might not be a feasible solution, because they
were not designed for high-speed WAMS [131–135]. This
important topic should be more thoroughly explored by the
research community.
C) Cryptographic schemes
As discussed in Section III-B, cryptography is indispens-
able in smart grids for the sake of security and data privacy.
However, existing cryptographic schemes do not meet spe-
cific requirements of smart grid systems. For example, the
limited computational and communication power of smart
meters demand low-complexity cryptographic schemes.
Furthermore, real-time power quality monitoring imposes
a strict constraint on the complexity of cryptographic algo-
rithms. Although some existing symmetric key encryption
schemes can be efficiently used for secure data transmission,
the distribution of the initial secret key is still a challeng-
ing problem due to the large scale of the smart grid sys-
tem.Conventional public-key-based secret sharing schemes
need to address the problems of scalability, efficiency, and
connectivity in smart grids. For data privacy, advanced
cryptographic schemes (e.g. homomorphic encryption) are
widely considered as a potential solution to data sharing
and data aggregation [136–139]. However, no practical solu-
tions have been found yet, especially for data sharing. Thus,
the design of efficient cryptographic schemes that satisfy the
security, privacy, and reliability requirements of smart grids
is an open research topic.
D) Key management
Key management is another critical issue in smart grid
research. A smart grid system typically has tens of millions
of users. The conventional key management system (e.g.
PKI) often fails to support key generation, distribution, and
revocation in such a large system, and a highly scalable key
management system is needed. Identity-based encryption
(IBE) is known to provide a possible solution, where the
device identity is automatically bound to its public keys. As
a result, there is no need for key generation and revocation.
A key management scheme also has to be computationally
efficient because of the limited computational and commu-
nication power of smart meters. In addition, due to the
large geographical coverage of a power system, some distant
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devices may only have intermittent connection with central
key management servers. Under this context, a distributed
key management scheme is needed to solve this prob-
lem. For example, key management can be accomplished
locally with proxy re-encryption and proxy re-signature
techniques [140–144]. The development of more scalable,
secure, robust, and efficient key management systems is
an important research topic to be further explored in the
near future.
V I I . CONCLUS IONS
Smart grid is considered the next generation electricity
grid, providing reliable and efficient electricity generation
and distribution, and accommodating high penetration of
clean, renewable energy. In this paper, we have studied the
design goals and architecture of smart grid and identified
its four major functions, namely, AMC, DSM, GSM, and
SP. We have also investigated the communication require-
ments, namely, data transmission, cyber security, data pri-
vacy, and interoperability requirements, of the smart grid
communication systems, followed by some of the recent
developments in such systems, including a communica-
tion framework as well as some newly developed commu-
nication standards for smart grid. Since each smart grid
function has very distinct communication requirements,
it is very unlikely that any single existing communication
technology will serve all. Therefore, we should design new
communication systems that take advantage of the exist-
ing communication technologies and satisfy the specific
requirements of smart grid.
The paper concludes with some future research direc-
tions, including communication supports for the V2G
system and WAMS, cryptographic schemes, and key
management.
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V I I I . L I ST OF ACRONYMS
A
AL Application Layer
AMC Advanced Monitoring and Control
AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure
AP Access Point
ARRA American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009
B
BB-PLC Broadband Power Line Communications
C
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability
CML Connection Management Layer





DER Distributed Energy Resources
DLC Direct Load Control
DLL Data Link Layer
DNP3 Distributed Network Protocol






EDFA Erbium Doped Fiber Amplifier
EIA Energy Information Administration
EMS Energy Management System
EPA Enhanced Performance Architecture
EOPN Ethernet Passive Optical Network
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
EPS Electric Power System
EV Electric Vehicle
G
GPON Gigabit Passive Optical Network
GPS Global Positioning System
GSM Generation and Storage Management
H
HAN Home Area Network
I
IBE Identity-Based Encryption
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers
IP Internet Protocol
IPv6 IP version 6




LAN Local Area Network
M
MTU Master Terminal Unit
N
NALM Non-intrusive Load Monitoring
NAN Neighborhood Area Network
NB-PLC Narrowband Power Line Communications
NIST National Institute of Standards and
Technology
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NRECA National Rural Electric Cooperative
Association
O
OSI Open Systems Interconnection
P
PDC Phasor Data Concentrator
PEV Plug-in Electric Vehicle
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PL Physical Layer
PLC Power Line Communications
PMU Phasor Measurement Unit
PON Passive Optical Network
PS-IAP Power System Interoperability
Q
QoS Quality of Service
R
RAS Remedial Action Scheme
REN21 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the
21st Century
ROI Return on Investment
RPL Routing Protocol for Low-power and Lossy
Links
RTU Remote Terminal Unit
S
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SGDI Smart Grid Demonstration Initiative
SGDP Smart Grid Demonstration Project
SGIP Smart Grid Interoperability Panel
SGIRM Smart Grid Interoperability Reference
Model
SP System Protection
SPS Special Protection Scheme







WACS Wide-Area Stability and Voltage Control
System
WAMS Wide-Area Measurement System
WAN Wide Area Network
WAPS Wide-Area Protection System
WDM Wavelength Division Multiplexing
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
WPAN Wireless Personal Area Network
#
6LoWPAN IPv6 over Lower Power WPAN
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